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Introduction
In [5] a solution concept for extensive-form games was introduced, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), and shown to be a strict re…nement of subgame-perfect equilibrium ( [18] ); it was also shown that, in turn, then notion of sequential equilibrium ( [11] ) is a strict re…nement of PBE. The central elements of the de…nition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium are the qualitative notions of plausibility order and AGM-consistency. As shown in [4] , these notions can be derived from the primitive concept of a player's epistemic state, which encodes the player's initial (or prior) beliefs and her disposition to revise those beliefs upon receiving (possibly unexpected) information. The existence of a plausibility order that rationalizes the epistemic state of each player guarantees that the belief revision policy of each player satis…es the axioms for "rational"belief revision introduced in [1] . In this paper we continue the study of PBE, in particular we explore the restrictions on belief revision incorporated in the notion of sequential equilibrium and provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a PBE to be a sequential equilibrium. There are two such conditions. One is the qualitative notion of choice-measurable plausibility order, which was shown in [5] to be implied by sequential equilibrium. Choice measurability requires that the plausibility order -on the set of histories that rationalizes the given assessment have a cardinal representation, in the sense that there is an integer-valued representation F : H ! N of -such that F (h) F (h 0 ) if and only if h -h 0 (this is the ordinal part) and, if a is an action available at h and h 0 (so that h and h 0 belong tot he same information set) then F (h) F (h 0 ) = F (ha) F (h 0 a) (this is the cardinal part). Thus a cardinal representation F measures the distance between histories and this distance is required to be preserved by the addition of a common action. The notion of choice measurability corresponds to the notion of labelling introduced in [11, p. 887] and further clari…ed in [19, 20] . The second condition is a strengthening of the notion of "consistent Bayesian updating" which is part of the de…nition of PBE.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the de…nition of PBE. Section 3 discusses choice measurability and provides two qualitative characterizations of it, one of which is known from the theory of qualitative probabilities and makes essential use of the structure of histories, and the other is, as far as I know, new and is more general, in the sense that it applies to pre-orders on arbitrary sets. In Section 4 it is shown that choice measurability together with a strengthening of the notion of "consistent Bayesian updating" are necessary and su¢ cient for a PBE to be a sequential equilibrium. Section 5 discusses related literature and Section 6 concludes. The proofs are given in Appendix B, while Appendix A reviews the notation of [5] , which is used throughout this paper.
AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium
We use the history-based de…nition of extensive-form game (see Appendix A). Recall that an assessment is a pair ( ; ) where is a behavior strategy pro…le and is a system of beliefs (that is, a collection of probability distributions, one for every information set, over the elements of that information set). An assessment encodes the beliefs and belief revision policy of the players: the strategy pro…le yields the initial beliefs as well as conditional beliefs about future moves, while gives conditional beliefs about past moves. The following de…nitions are taken from [5] .
Given a set H, a total pre-order on H is a binary relation on H which is complete (8h; h 0 2 H, either h -h 0 or h 0 -h) and transitive (8h; h 0 ; h 00 2 H, if h -h 0 and h 0 -h 00 then h -h 00 ).
De…nition 1 Given an extensive form, a plausibility order is a total pre-order on the set of histories H that satis…es the following properties: for every h 2 D (D is the set of decision histories), P L1: h -ha; 8a 2 A(h) (A(h) is the set of actions available at h), P L2: (i) 9a 2 A(h) such that ha -h, (ii) 8a 2 A(h); if ha -h then h 0 a -h 0 ; 8h 0 2 I(h) (I(h) is the information set that contains h), P L3: if history h is assigned to chance, then ha -h, 8a 2 A(h):
If h -h 0 we say that history h is at least as plausible as history h 0 . 1 Property P L1 says that adding an action to a decision history h cannot yield a more plausible history than h itself. Property P L2 says that at every decision history h there is some action a such that adding a to h yields a history which is at least as plausible as h and, furthermore, any such action a performs the same role with any other history that belongs to the same information set. Property P L3 says that all the actions at a history assigned to chance are "plausibility preserving". We write h h 0 (with the interpretation that h is as plausible as h 0 ) as a short-hand for "h -h 0 and h 0 -h" (thus is an equivalence relation on H) and we write h h 0 (with the interpretation that h is more plausible than h 0 ) as a short-hand for "h -h 0 and not h 0 -h". It follows from Property P L1 that, for every h; h 0 2 H, if h 0 is a pre…x of h then h 0 -h. Furthermore, by Properties P L1 and P L2, for every decision history h, there is at least one action a at h such that h ha, that is, ha is as plausible as h and, furthermore, if h 0 belongs to the same information set as h, then h 0 h 0 a. We call such actions plausibility preserving.
A plausibility order encodes a qualitative description of the epistemic state of each player, that is, the player's initial beliefs (or prior beliefs: her beliefs before the game is played) and her disposition to revise those beliefs when informed that it is her turn to move.
De…nition 2 Fix an extensive-form. An assessment ( ; ) is AGM-consistent if there exists a plausibility order -on the set of histories H such that:
(i) the actions that are assigned positive probability by are precisely the plausibility-preserving actions: 8h 2 D; 8a 2 A(h), (a) > 0 if and only if h ha;
(P 1)
(ii) the histories that are assigned positive probability by are precisely those that are most plausible within the corresponding information set: 8h 2 D;
If -satis…es properties P 1 and P 2 with respect to ( ; ), we say that -rationalizes ( ; ).
An assessment ( ; ) is sequentially rational if, for every player i and every information set I of hers, player i's expected payo¤ -given the strategy pro…le and her beliefs at I -cannot be increased by unilaterally changing her choice at I and possibly at information sets of hers that follow I.
2 In order to de…ne sequential rationality more precisely we need additional notation. Let Z denote the set of terminal histories and, for every player i, let U i : Z ! R be player i's von NeumannMorgenstern utility function. Given a decision history h, let Z(h) be the set of terminal histories that have h as a pre…x. Let P h; be the probability distribution over Z(h) induced by the strategy pro…le , starting from history h (that is, if z is a terminal history and z = ha 1 :::a m then P h; (z) = Q m j=1 (a j )). Let I be an information set of player i and let u i (Ij ; ) =
be player i 0 s expected payo¤ at I if is played, given her beliefs at I (as speci…ed by ). We say that player i's strategy i is sequentially rational at I if u i (Ij( i ; i ); ) u i (Ij( i ; i ); ) for every strategy i of player i (where i denotes the strategy pro…le of the players other than i, that is, i = ( 1 ; :::; i 1 ; i+1 ; :::; n )).
De…nition 3 An assessment ( ; ) is sequentially rational if, for every player i and for every information set I of player i, i is sequentially rational at I:
In conjunction with sequential rationality, the notion of AGM-consistency is su¢ cient to eliminate some Nash equilibria as "implausible". Consider, for example, the extensive game of Figure  1 and the pure-strategy pro…le = (c; d; f ) (highlighted by double edges), which constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game (and also a subgame-perfect equilibrium since there are no proper subgames). Can be part of a sequentially rational AGM-consistent assessment ( ; )? Since, for Player 3, choice f can be rational only if the player assigns (su¢ ciently high) positive probability to history be, sequential rationality requires that (be) > 0; however, any such assessment is not AGM-consistent. In fact, if there were a plausibility order -that satis…ed De…nition 2, then, by P 1, b bd (since (d) = 1 > 0) and b be (since (e) = 0) 3 and, by P 2, be -bd (since -by hypothesis -assigns positive probability to be). By transitivity of -, from b bd and b be it follows that bd be, yielding a contradiction. The Nash equilibrium = (c; d; f ) cannot be part of a sequentially rational AGM-consistent assessment. Figure 1 On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium 0 = (b; d; g) together with 0 (bd) = 1 forms a sequentially rational, AGM-consistent assessment: it can be rationalized by several plausibility orders, for 3 By de…nition of plausibility order, b -be and, by P1, it is not the case that b be because e is not assigned positive probability by . Thus b be.
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Throughout this paper we adopt the following representation of a total pre-order: if the row to which history h belongs is above the row to which h 0 belongs, then h h 0 (h is more plausible than h 0 ) and if h and h 0 belong to the same row then h h 0 (h is as plausible as h 0 ).
De…nition 4
Fix an extensive form. Let -be a plausibility order that rationalizes the assessment ( ; ). We say that ( ; ) is Bayesian relative to -if for every --equivalence class E that contains some decision history h with (h) > 0, there exists a probability measure E : H ! [0; 1] such that:
B2: If h; h 0 2 Supp( E ) and h 0 = ha 1 :::a m (that is, h is a pre…x of h 0 ) then
::: (a m ):
Property B1 requires that E (h) > 0 if and only if h 2 E and (h) > 0 (thus E (h) = 0 if and only if either h 2 HnE or (h) = 0). Property B2 requires E to be consistent with the strategy pro…le in the sense that if h; h 0 2 E, E (h) > 0, E (h 0 ) > 0 and h 0 = ha 1 :::a m then the probability of h 0 (according to E ) is equal to the probability of h multiplied by the probabilities (according to ) of the actions that lead from h to h 0 . 4 Property B3 requires the system of beliefs to satisfy Bayes' rule in the sense that if history h belongs to information set I then (h) (the probability assigned to h by ) is the probability of h conditional on I using the probability measure E , where E is the equivalence class of the most plausible elements of I. In fact, as shown in [5] , Property B3 is equivalent to the following (for every I H, let M in -I denote the set of most plausible
For every information set I such that M in -I E and, for every
De…nition 5 An assessment ( ; ) is Bayesian AGM-consistent if it is rationalized by a plausibility order -on the set of histories H and it is Bayesian relative to -.
The last ingredient of the de…nition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the standard requirement of sequential rationality.
De…nition 6 An assessment ( ; ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it is Bayesian AGMconsistent and sequentially rational.
Remark 7
It is proved in [5] that if ( ; ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium then is a subgameperfect equilibrium and that every sequential equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (but the converse is not true). The example of Figure 1 shows that PBE is a strict re…nement of subgameperfect equilibrium (since in that game every Nash equilibrium is subgame-perfect because there are no proper subgames). The assessment = (c; d; g); (a) = (be) = 1 is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Figure 2 For the game illustrated in Figure 2 , a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by = (c; d; g) and (a) = (be) = 1 ( is highlighted by double edges and the histories that are assigned positive probability by are shown as black nodes). In fact ( ; ) is sequentially rational and, furthermore, it is rationalized by the following plausibility order and is Bayesian relative to it (as can be veri…ed using the following measures on the equivalence classes of the plausibility order that contain histories h with (h) > 0): 0
;; c a; ad b; bd be; beg ae; aeg bef aef
As explained below, the belief revision policy encoded in the PBE shown in Figure 2 may be criticized as failing to be "minimal". In the following sections we introduce restrictions on belief revision that can be used to re…ne the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and provide a characterization of sequential equilibrium which is essentially qualitative.
3 Choice-measurable plausibility orders
The belief revision policy encoded in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium can be interpreted either as the epistemic state of an external observer 5 or as a belief revision policy which is shared by all the players. For example, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium illustrated in Figure 2 re ‡ects the following belief revision policy: the initial beliefs are that Player 1 will play c; conditional on learning that Player 1 did not play c, the observer would become convinced that Player 1 played a (that is, she would judge a to be strictly more plausible than b) and would expect Player 2 to play d; upon learning that (Player 1 did not play c and) Player 2 did not play d, the observer would become convinced that Player 1 played b and Player 2 played e, hence judging be to be strictly more plausible than ae, thereby reversing her earlier belief that a was strictly more plausible than b. Although such a belief revision policy does not violate the rationality constraints introduced in [1] , it does involve a belief change which is not "minimal". Such "non-minimal" belief changes can be ruled out by imposing the following restriction on the plausibility order: if h and h 0 belong to the same information set (h 0 2 I(h)) and a is an action available at h (a 2 A(h)), then
IN D 1 says that if h is deemed to be at least as plausible as h 0 then the addition of any action a must preserve this judgment, in the sense that ha must be deemed to be at least as plausible as h 0 a, and vice versa; it can also be viewed as an "independence" condition, in the sense that observation of a new action cannot lead to a change in the relative plausibility of previous actions. Any plausibility order that rationalizes the assessment shown in Figure 2 must violate IN D 1 .
Another "minimality" or "independence" condition is the following, which says that if action a is implicitly judged to be at least as plausible as action b conditional on history h then the same judgment must be made conditional on any other history that belongs to the same information set as h: if h 0 2 I(h) and a; b 2 A(h), then
These two properties of plausibility orders are independent of each other: see Lemma 9 below. Rather than investigating re…nements of perfect Bayesian equilibrium induced by properties such as IN D 1 and IN D 2 , we will focus on one property of plausibility orders that implies both IN D 1 and IN D 2 and is at the core of the notion of sequential equilibrium. The following de…nitions are taken from [5] .
Given a plausibility order -on a …nite set of histories H, a function F : H ! N (where N denotes the set of non-negative integers) is said to be an ordinal integer-valued representation ofif, for every h; h 0 2 H,
Since H is …nite, the set of ordinal integer-valued representations is non-empty. A particular ordinal integer-valued representation, which we will call canonical and denote by , is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 8 Let H 0 = fh 2 H : h -x; 8x 2 Hg, H 1 = fh 2 H n H 0 : h -x; 8x 2 HnH 0 g and, in general, for every integer k 1,
Thus H 0 is the equivalence class of -containing the most plausible histories, H 1 is the equivalence class containing the most plausible among the histories left after removing those in H 0 , etc. 6 The canonical ordinal integer-valued representation of -, : H ! N, is given by
We call (h) the rank of history h:
Using , property IN D 1 can be restated as follows: if h 0 2 I(h) and a 2 A(h) then
Instead of an ordinal representation of the plausibility order -one could seek a cardinal representation F : H ! N which, besides (2), satis…es the following property: if h 0 2 I(h) and a 2 A(h), then 
The proof of the following lemma is given in Appendix B. De…nition 10 A plausibility order -on the set of histories H is choice-measurable if there exists an (2) property IN D 1 C (which, by the above lemma, is equivalent to IN D 2 C). We call such a function F a cardinal integer-valued representation of -. Note that, without loss of generality, we can set F (;) = 0. 6 Since H is …nite, there is an m 2 N such that fH 0 ; :::; Hmg is a partition of H and, for every j; k 2 N, with j < k m, and for every h; h 0 2 H, if h 2 H j and
Then F is a cardinal representation of -if and only if F is. It is straightforward to show that, within the context of a set of histories, the notion of choice measurability coincides with the notion of "additive plausibility" discussed in [20] . In Proposition 14 we will deal with a more general notion that, unlike the notion of additive plausibility, can be applied to arbitrary sets.
Note that even if a plausibility order is choice measurable there is no guarantee that the canonical representation is also a cardinal representation, that is, that satis…es property IN D 1 C. This fact is illustrated in [5, Figure 4, p. 577] .
IN D 1 C implies both IN D 1 and IN D 2 , but the converse is not true, as can be seen from the game shown in Figure 3 , which is based on an example discussed in [2] and [9] . The assessment = (M;`; (a; c; e)); (M ) = (M r) = (Lm) = (R`) = 1 is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium but cannot be rationalized by a choice-measurable plausibility order. Figure 3 The assessment = (M;`; (a; c; e)); (M ) = (M r) = (Lm) = (R`) = 1 is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, rationalized by the following plausibility order, which satis…es IN D 1 and IN D 2 . For simplicity we have omitted from the order the terminal histories, since they are not relevant for the following discussion.
8 8 The complete order is as follows:
However, this plausibility order is not choice measurable as will be shown below.
Our objective is to …nd necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a plausibility order to be choice measurable. We start with a discussion of the plausibility order (5), which is reproduced below together with the canonical ordinal integer-valued representation and the corresponding values of the cardinal function F : H ! N that we are seeking. Thus, for example,
:
Condition IN D 1 C imposes the following constraints:
which, using the notation of (6), can be written as
Thus the problem is to determine whether there exist positive integers y i (i = 1; :::; 6) such that (1) y i < y i+1 for all i = 1; :::; 5 and (2) the system of equations (8) is satis…ed. The problem can be further simpli…ed by de…ning new integers x 1 ; :::; x 6 as follows: for every i = 1; :::; 6; x i = y i y i 1 (letting y 0 = 0), so that, for k > j, y k y j = x j+1 + x j+2 + :::
): With this transformation, the constraints (8) can be rewritten as
and the problem of …nding a cardinal representation of (5) reduces to determining whether there are positive integers x 1 ; :::; x 6 that satisfy the system of equations (9) . The answer is negative, since subtracting the …rst equation from the second yields x 2 + x 3 + x 4 = x 3 , that is, x 2 + x 4 = 0 which is not compatible with x 2 and x 4 being positive. Thus the plausibility order (5) is not choice measurable. 9 We now provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a plausibility order to be choice measurable. The …rst characterization of choice measurability, which is known, is given in Proposition 11 and exploits the structure of the elements of H as sequences (and thus sets) of actions, while the second characterization is more general and, as far as I know, new.
For the …rst characterization we need to introduce some de…nitions. Given a …nite set of histories H and a total pre-order -on H, let C = h(h 1 ; h 2 ) ; (h 3 ; h 4 ) ; :::; (h n 1 ; h n )i (with n 2 and, clearly, n even), be a sequence in -(thus h i -h i+1 , for all odd i). Let A(C) = fa 2 A : a 2 h i for some i = 1; :::; ng be the set of actions that appear in at lest one history in sequence C. For every a 2 A(C) de…ne Odd(a) = fi : a 2 h i and i is oddg and Even(a) = fi : a 2 h i and i is eveng. We say that the sequence is cancelling if, for every a 2 A(C), the cardinality of Odd(a) is equal to the cardinality of Even(a), that is, if every action in A(C) appears as many times in the odd-numbered histories as in the even-numbered histories. A cancelling sequence is strict if, for at least one pair
The following proposition is an application of a known result in qualitative probability theory ( [10, 17, 7] ) to the set of histories H, where each history is viewed as a set of actions. For a proof see [20, Lemma 4 
.1, p. 19].
Proposition 11 A plausibility order -on H is choice measurable if and only there are no strict cancelling sequences in -.
As an application of the above proposition, consider the plausibility order (5), which we already showed not to be choice measurable. Then, by Proposition 11, there must be a strict cancelling sequence and indeed one such sequence is h(R; M m); (M r; L); (Lm; Rr)i. In fact, A(C) = fL; M; R; m; rg, Odd(R) = f1g,
The test for choice measurability provided by Proposition 11 has two drawbacks, one practical and one conceptual. From a practical point of view, the larger the set H (and thus the more complex the plausibility order -on H) the more di¢ cult it is to determine whether or not a cancelling sequence exists. From a conceptual point of view, the necessary and su¢ cient condition identi…ed in Proposition 11 makes no reference to (and no use of) the constraints corresponding to condition IN D 1 C, which are at the core of the notion of choice measurability (for example, the constraints (7) for the plausibility order (5)). The following characterization, on the other hand, makes explicit use of those constraints; furthermore, it applies to the more general case of a total pre-order on an arbitrary …nite set S (whose elements need not have the structure of sets of atomes, e.g. sequences of actions).
Let S be an arbitrary …nite set and let -be a total pre-order on S. Let Sn be the set of equivalence classes of S. Problem 12 Given a pair (-; : =), where -is a total pre-order on a …nite set S and : = is an equivalence relation on the set of equivalence classes of -, determine whether there exists a function F : S ! N such that, for all s; t; x; y 2 S, (1) F (s) F (t) if and only if s -t and (2) 
Instead of expressing : = in terms of pairs of elements of Sn , we shall express it in terms of pairs of numbers (j; k) obtained by using the canonical ordinal representation of -. 10 :
If the equivalence relation : = contains the following pairs:
then we express them (using ) as 
A bag ( or multiset) is a generalization of the notion of set in which members are allowed to appear more than once. An example of a bag is f1; 2; 2; 3; 4; 4; 5; 6g. Given two bags B 1 and B 2 their union, denoted by B 1 dB 2 , is the bag that contains those elements that occur in either B 1 or B 2 and, furthermore, the number of times that each element occurs in B 1 dB 2 is equal to the number of times it occurs in B 1 plus the number of times it occurs in B 2 . For instance, if B 1 = f1; 2; 2; 3; 4; 4; 5; 6g and B 2 = f2; 3; 6; 6g then B 1 d B 2 = f1; 2; 2; 2; 3; 3; 4; 4; 5; 6; 6; 6g. We say that B 1 is a proper sub-bag of B 2 , denoted by B 1 @ B 2 ; if B 1 6 = B 2 and each element that occurs in B 1 occurs also, and at least as many times, in B 2 : For example, f1; 2; 4; 4; 5; 6g @ f1; 1; 2; 4; 4; 5; 5; 6g :
Now, given a pair (i; j) with i < j, we associate with it the set B (i;j) = fi + 1; i + 2; :::; jg. For example, B (2;5) = f3; 4; 5g: Given a set of pairs P = f(i 1 ; j 1 ); (i 2 ; j 2 ); :::; (i m ; j m )g (with i k < j k ; for every k = 1; :::; m) we associate with it the bag B P = B (i1;j1) d B (i2;j2) d ::: d B (im;jm) . For example, if P = f(0; 2); (1; 4); (2; 5)g then B P = f1; 2g d f2; 3; 4g d f3; 4; 5g = f1; 2; 2; 3; 3; 4; 4; 5g:
De…nition 13 For every element of : =, expressed (using the canonical representation ) as (i; j) : = (k;`) (with i j and k `), the equation corresponding to it is x i+1 + x i+2 + ::: + x j = x k+1 + x k+2 +:::+x`. By the system of equations corresponding to : = we mean the set of all such equations.
For example, consider the total pre-order given in (10) and the following equivalence relation : = expressed in terms of and omitting the re ‡exive pairs: Then the corresponding system of equations is given by:
which can also be expressed as 
Note that, because of symmetry of : =, for every row a k of the matrix A there is a row a j such that a j = a k :
We are now ready to state the solution to Problem 12. The proof is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 14 Given a pair (-; : =), where -is a total pre-order on a …nite set S and : = is an equivalence relation on the set of equivalence classes of -, the following are equivalent.
(A) There is a function F : S ! N such that, for all s; t; x; y 2 S, (1) F (s) F (t) if and only if s -t and (2) 1 2 Using the canonical ordinal representation of -, condition (2) can also be expressed as follows: if (i; j) : = (k;`) (with i < j; and k <`) and (s) = i, (t) = j, (x) = k and (y) =`, then F (t) F (s) = F (y) F (x):
As an application of Proposition 14 consider the total pre-order given in (5). 13 Then B lef t = f1; 2; 3g d f5g = f1; 2; 3; 5g and B right = f2; 3; 4; 5; 6) d f1; 2g = f1; 2; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g. Thus, since B lef t @ B right , by Part C of the above proposition -is not choice measurable (as we had determined above with a di¤erent method).
As a further application of Proposition 14 consider the total pre-order -given in (10) together with the subset of the equivalence relation : = given in (11) . Then there is no cardinal representation of -that satis…es the constraints expressed by : =, because of Part C of the above proposition and the following sequence: 
In fact, the above sequence corresponds to the following system of equations:
corresponding to (3; 4) : = (1; 3) x 5 + x 6 = x 1 + x 2 corresponding to (4; 6) :
Adding the four equations we get x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 + x 5 + x 6 = x 1 + 2x 2 + x 3 + x 4 + x 5 + x 6 which simpli…es to 0 = x 2 , which is incompatible with a positive solution (in particular with x 2 > 0).
Remark 15
In [6] an algorithm is provided for determining whether a system of linear equations has a positive solution and for calculating such a solution if one exists. Furthermore, if the coe¢ cients of the equations are integers and a positive solution exists, then the algorithm yields a solution consisting of positive integers.
4 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium.
We now show that choice measurability of the underlying plausibility order is what essentially is needed to go from perfect Bayesian equilibrium to sequential equilibrium. First we recall the de…nition of sequential equilibrium. An assessment ( ; ) is KW-consistent ('KW'stands for 'KrepsWilson') if there is an in…nite sequence 1 ; :::; m ; ::: of completely mixed strategy pro…les such that, letting m be the unique system of beliefs obtained from m by applying Bayes' rule, lim m!1 ( m ; m ) = ( ; ). An assessment ( ; ) is a sequential equilibrium if it is KW-consistent and sequentially rational.
It is shown in [5] that if ( ; ) is a KW-consistent assessment then there is a choice-measurable plausibility order that rationalizes it and that the notion of sequential equilibrium is a strict re…ne-ment of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In this section we show that choice measurability together with a strengthening of De…nition 4 is necessary and su¢ cient for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium to be a sequential equilibrium.
Given a system of beliefs we denote by D + the set of decision histories that are assigned positive probability by , that is,
De…nition 16 Fix an extensive form. Let -be a plausibility order that rationalizes the assessment ( ; ). We say that ( ; ) is uniformly Bayesian relative to -if there exists a function : D ! (0; 1] that satis…es the following properties:
The following lemma, proved in Appendix B, shows that De…nition 16 is a strengthening of De…nition 4.
Lemma 17
Fix an extensive form. Let -be a plausibility order that rationalizes the assessment ( ; ). If ( ; ) is uniformly Bayesian relative to -then it is Bayesian relative to -.
The following proposition, which is proved in Appendix B, makes use of a result proved in [19] .
Proposition 18
Fix an extensive form and an assessment ( ; ). The following are equivalent: (A) ( ; ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which is rationalized by a choice measurable plausibility order -and is uniformly Bayesian relative to -.
(B) ( ; ) is a sequential equilibrium.
As an application of Proposition 18 consider the extensive game of Figure 4 . Let ( ; ) be an assessment with = ((a; f ); T; L), (b) > 0 and (c) > 0. Then ( ; ) can be rationalized by a choice-measurable plausibility order only if is such that 16 either (bB) = (cBf ) = 0, or (bB) > 0 and (cBf ) > 0:
1 6 Proof. Let -be a choice measurable plausibility order that rationalizes ( ; ) and let F be a cardinal representation of it. Since (b) > 0 and (c) > 0, b c and thus F (b) = F (c). By choice measurability, F (bB) F (cB) = F (b) F (c) and thus F (bB) = F (cB), so that bB cB. Since f is plausibility preserving, cB cBf and therefore, by transitivity of -, bB cBf . Hence if (bB) > 0 then bB 2 M in -fbB; cBf; dg and thus cBf 2 M in -fbB; cBf; dg so that (cBf ) > 0. The proof that if (cBf ) > 0 then (bB) > 0 is similar.
If, besides from being rationalized by a choice-measurable plausibility order -, ( ; ) is also uniformly Bayesian relative to -(De…nition 16), then
Thus for example, continuing to assume that = ((a; f ); T; L), the assessment ( ;~ ) with~ (b) = and, since (f ) = 1 > 0, (cBf ) = (cB) (f ) = (cB). Let E be the equivalence class that contains b:
and (c) =
: Let G be the equivalence class that contains bB. Then, by (14) , fbB; cBf g G \ D + and, by U B3, (bB) =
: Thus, since (cBf ) = (cB),
and, therefore, since -as shown above -
we have that , (c) = (cB) = (cBf ) = 3 18 , (d) = 8 18 . 1 9 Both ( ;~ ) and ( ;^ ) are rationalized by the choice measurable plausibility order given in Footnote 18.
16
One can argue that the core of the characterization of sequential equilibrium provided in Proposition 18 is the notion of choice measurability of the order that rationalizes the given assessment. As shown in the above example, choice measurability constrains the support of , while the additional condition that the assessment be uniformly Bayesian adds the requirement that the ratios of probabilities be preserved (whenever meaningful). Hence, Proposition 18, in conjunction with Proposition 14, provides an essentially qualitative characterization of sequential equilibrium. 20 
Related literature
The work which is most closely related to this paper is [19, 20] . In [20] the author shows the following (using our notation). A set of actions and histories b A [ H is called a "basement"if it coincides with the support of at least one assessment, that is, if there is an assessment ( ; ) such that a 2 b if and only if (a) > 0 and h 2 b if and only if (h) > 0. Given a basement, one can construct a partial relation -on the set of histories H as follows: (1) If the plausibility relationderived from a basement b can be extended to a total pre-order -that has an additive representation, then there exists a KW-consistent assessment ( ; ) whose support coincides with b. Conversely, given a KW-consistent assessment ( ; ), the plausibility relation -derived from its basement can be extended to a total pre-order -that has an additive representation.
Streufert also proves [20, Lemma 4.1, p. 19] a result which is strictly related to Proposition 11 above, namely that if -is a binary relation on the set of subsets of a …nite set A then it has a completion represented additively by a mass function : A ! Z if and only if it there is no strict canceling sequence.
There is a clear connection between Proposition 19 and Proposition 18. However, while Proposition 19 characterizes basements that are supported by a KW-consistent assessment, Proposition 18 focuses on a particular PBE ( ; ) and on the conditions that are necessary and su¢ cient for ( ; ) to be a sequential equilibrium. One of these conditions is choice measurability of the plausibility order that rationalizes ( ; ), which coincides with the existence of an additive representation of a total pre-order that extends the plausibility relation obtained from the support of ( ; ). The other condition is that ( ; ) be uniformly Bayesian relative to -. As detailed in the proof of Proposition 18, this condition is related to the existence of a pair of functions c : A ! (0; 1] and e : A ! Z [ f0g that Streufert proves to be necessary and su¢ cient for KW-consistency (see Proposition 23 in Appendix B).
21
On the other hand, the characterization of choice measurability of a total pre-order provided in Proposition 14 is new and more general than Proposition 11 because it applies to arbitrary sets, whose elements do not necessarily have the structure of sets of atoms (such as actions).
Propositions 18, 19 and 23 are all related to two results provided in [11, Lemma A1, p. 887 and Lemma A2, p. 888]. For a detailed discussion of those results (and how to correct a ‡aw in the original proof) see [19] .
The characterization of sequential equilibrium provided in Proposition 18 does not make any use of sequences and limits. This is true also of the characterizations of KW-consistency provided in [9] and [13] , where it is shown how to derive a …nite system of algebraic equations and inequalities on behavioral strategies and beliefs that characterizes the set of consistent assessments ( [3] provides an indirect proof of the fact that consistent assessments are determined by …nitely many algebraic equations and inequalities). [9] makes use of relative probability spaces ( ; ) (which express the notion of an event being in…nitely less likely than another) and random variables s i :
! S i (where S i is the set of pure strategies of player i), representing the beliefs of an external observer (who can assess the relative probabilities of any two strategy pro…les, even those that have zero probability). The authors provide a characterization of KW-consistency in terms of the notion of strong independence for relative probability spaces (and, in turn, a characterization of strong independence in terms of weak independence and exchangeability).
22
The algebraic characterization of KW-consistency provided in [13] is based on a system of equations and inequalities obtained from two functions: one de…ned on actions and the other on histories. The function de…ned on actions implicitly de…nes an "order of likelihood" on actions, with some actions being "in…nitely less likely" than others. Together the two functions provide an "extended" behavioral conjecture pro…le. The characterization is essentially equivalent to the one reported in Proposition 23 in Appendix B and for details the reader is referred to Footnote 28.
Conclusion
Besides sequential rationality, the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium introduced in [5] is based on two elements: (1) the qualitative notions of plausibility order and AGM-consistency and (2) the notion of Bayesian updating relative to the plausibility order (which captures the requirement that Bayes'rule be used whenever possible, even after revision prompted by the observation of a zero probability event). In this paper we showed (Proposition 18) that by strengthening these two conditions one obtains a characterization of sequential equilibrium.
The strengthening of the …rst condition is that the plausibility order that rationalizes the given assessment be choice measurable, that it, that there be a cardinal representation of it, which can be interpreted as measuring the distance between histories in a way that is preserved by the addition of a common action ( condition IN D 1 C) . Proposition 14 provides a qualitative characterization of choice measurability, which is very general, in that it applies to arbitrary sets (thus not only to sets consisting of sequences of actions); for instance it can be applied to the problem of determining if 2 1 That proposition, in turn, is essentially equivalent to a result in [13] : see Footnote 28 in Appendix B. At the 13 th SAET conference in July 2013 Streufert presented a characterization of the support of KW-consistent assessments in terms of additive plausibility and a condition that he called "pseudo-Bayesian" which is essentially a reformulation of one of the conditions given in Proposition 23 (see Appendix B).
2 2 [2] shows that in games with observable deviators weak independence su¢ ces for KW-consistency.
there exists a cardinal utility function on a set of alternatives S under a set of constraints of the form
, interpreted as "the change from a to b is just as good (or just as bad) as the change from c to d.
The strengthening of the second condition is called "uniform Bayesian updating"and amounts to the requirement that the relative ratios of the probabilities of two histories be preserved (whenever possible and meaningful: see the discussion of the example that follows Proposition 14).
A Appendix: history-based de…nition of extensive game
If A is a set, we denote by A the set of …nite sequences in A. If h = ha 1 ; :::; a k i 2 A and 1 j k, the sequence h 0 = ha 1 ; :::; a j i is called a pre…x of h. If h = ha 1 ; :::; a k i 2 A and a 2 A, we denote the sequence ha 1 ; :::; a k ; ai by ha.
A …nite extensive form is a tuple A; H; N; ; f i g i2N whose elements are:
A …nite set of actions A.
A …nite set of histories H A which is closed under pre…xes (that is, if h 2 H and h 0 2 A is a pre…x of h, then h 0 2 H). The null history hi ; denoted by ;, is an element of H and is a pre…x of every history. A history h 2 H such that, for every a 2 A, ha = 2 H, is called a terminal history. The set of terminal histories is denoted by Z. D = HnZ denotes the set of non-terminal or decision histories. For every history h 2 H, we denote by A(h) the set of actions available at h, that is, A(h) = fa 2 A : ha 2 Hg. Thus A(h) 6 = ? if and only if h 2 D. We assume that A = S h2D A(h) (that is, we restrict attention to actions that are available at some decision history).
A …nite set N = f1; :::; ng of players. In some cases there is also an additional, …ctitious, player called chance.
A function : D ! N [ fchanceg that assigns a player to each decision history. Thus (h) is the player who moves at history h. A game is said to be without chance moves if (h) 2 N for every h 2 D: For every i 2 N [ fchanceg, let D i = 1 (i) be the histories assigned to player i. Thus fD chance ; D 1 ; :::; D n g is a partition of D: If history h is assigned to chance, then a probability distribution over A(h) is given that assigns positive probability to every a 2 A(h).
For every player i 2 N , i is an equivalence relation on D i . The interpretation of h i h 0 is that, when choosing an action at history h 2 D i , player i does not know whether she is moving at h or at h 0 . The equivalence class of h 2 D i is denoted by I i (h) and is called an information set of player i; thus
, that is, the set of actions available to a player is the same at any two histories that belong to the same information set of that player.
The following property, known as perfect recall, is assumed: for every player i 2 N , if h 1 ; h 2 2 D i , a 2 A(h 1 ) and h 1 a is a pre…x of h 2 then for every h 0 2 I i (h 2 ) there exists an h 2 I i (h 1 ) such that ha is a pre…x of h 0 . Intuitively, perfect recall requires a player to remember what she knew in the past and what actions she took previously.
Given an extensive form, one obtains an extensive game by adding, for every player i 2 N , a utility ( or payo¤ ) function U i : Z ! R (where R denotes the set of real numbers; recall that Z is the set of terminal histories).
Notation 20
If h and h 0 are decision histories not assigned to chance, we often write h 0 2 I(h) as a short-hand for h 0 2 I (h) (h). Thus h 0 2 I(h) means that h and h 0 belong to the same information set (of the player who moves at h). If h is a history assigned to chance, we use the convention that I(h) = fhg.
Remark 21
In order to simplify the notation we assume that no action is available at more than one information set:
Given an extensive form, a pure strategy of player i 2 N is a function that associates with every information set of player i an action at that information set, that is, a function s i :
. A behavior strategy of player i is a collection of probability distributions, one for each information set, over the actions available at that information set; that is, a function i : D i ! (A) (where (A) denotes the set of probability distributions over A) such that (1) i (h) is a probability distribution over A(h) and (2) 
If the game does not have chance moves, we de…ne a behavior strategy pro…le as an n-tuple = ( 1 ; :::; n ) where, for every i 2 N , i is a behavior strategy of player i. If the game has chance moves then we use the convention that a behavior strategy pro…le is an (n+1)-tuple = ( 1 ; :::; n ; chance ) where, if h is a history assigned to chance and a 2 A(h) then chance (h)(a) is the probability associated with a. Given our assumption that no action is available at more than one information set, without risking ambiguity we denote by (a) the probability assigned to action a by the relevant component of the strategy pro…le . Note that a pure strategy is a special case of a behavior strategy where each probability distribution is degenerate. A behavior strategy is completely mixed at history h 2 D if, for every a 2 A(h), (a) > 0.
An assessment is a pair ( ; ) where is a behavior strategy pro…le and is a system of beliefs, that is, a collection of probability distributions, one for every information set, over the elements of that information set. Thus : D ! (H) (where (H) is the set of probability distributions over the set of histories H) such that if h 2 D then (h) is a probability distribution over I(h) (the information set that constains history h) and if h 0 2 I(h) then (h) = (h 0 ). If the game has chance moves, then we use the convention that (h) = 1 for every history h assigned to chance. With slight abose of notation, we denote by (h) the probability assigned to history h by the system of beliefs Figure 2 (IN D 1 is violated since a b but be ae) .
On the other hand, the following example shows a plausibility order that satis…es IN D 1 but not IN D 2 (the underlying game is a simultaneous game where Player 1 chooses between a and b and Player 2 chooses among c; d and e; the plausibility-preserving actions are a and c; note that I(a) = fa; bg and ad ae but be bd]: ;; a; ac b; bc ad ae be bd
Let -be a plausibility order on the set of histories H and let F : H ! N be an integer-valued representation that satis…es IN D 1 C. Without loss of generality (see De…nition 10), we can assume that F (;) = 0: For every decision history h and action a 2 A(h), de…ne
The function : A ! N is well de…ned, since, by
in Appendix A, the assumption that no action belongs to two di¤erent information sets). Then, for every history h = ha 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a m i, 
. From this and (17) it follows that
Proof of Proposition 14. (A) ) (B). Let F 0 : S ! N satisfy the properties of Part A. Fix an arbitrary s 0 2 S 0 = fs 2 S : s -t; 8t 2 Sg and de…ne F : S ! N by F (s) = F 0 (s) F 0 (s 0 ). Then F is also a function that satis…es the properties of Part A (note that since, for all s 2 S,
Sg (where is the canonical ordinal representation of -: see Footnote 10). For every k 2 K, de…nê x 0 = 0 and, for k > 0, x k = F (t) F (s) for some s; t 2 S such that (t) = k and (s) = k 1:
Note thatx k is well de…ned since, if x; y 2 S are such that (y) = k and (x) = k 1, then x s and y t and thus, by (1) of Property A, F (x) = F (s) and F (y) = F (t). Note also that, for all k 2 Knf0g,x k is a positive integer, since (t) = k and (s) = k 1 imply that s t and thus, by (1) of Property A, F (s) < F (t). We want to show that the values fx k g k2Knf0g de…ned in (18) provide a solution to the system of equations corresponding to : = (Deinition 13 : = (j 1 ; j 2 ) (thus i 1 = (s 1 ), i 2 = (s 2 ), j 1 = (t 1 ), j 2 = (t 2 ), i 1 < i 2 and j 1 < j 2 ). Then the corresponding equation (see De…nition 13) is: x i1+1 + x i1+2 + ::: + x i2 = x j1+1 + x j1+2 + ::: + x j2 . By (2) of Property A,
Using (18), F (s 2 ) F (s 1 ) =x i1+1 +x i1+2 +:::+x i2 : To see this, for every k 2 fi 1 + 1; i 1 + 2; :::; i 2 1g, …x an arbitrary r k 2 S such that (r k ) = k; then, by (18),
+ ::: +x i2 |{z} :
Similarly, F (t 2 ) F (t 1 ) =x j1+1 +x j1+2 + ::: +x j2 . Thus, by (19) ,x i1+1 +x i1+2 + ::: +x i2 = x j1+1 +x j1+2 + ::: +x j2 .
(B) ) (A). assume that the system of equations corresponding to : = has a solution consisting of positive integersx 1 ; :::;x m . De…ne F : S ! N as follows: if (s) = 0 (equivalently, s 2 S 0 ) then F (s) = 0 and if (s) = k > 0 (equivalently, s 2 S k for k > 0) then F (s) =x 1 +x 2 + ::: +x k (where and the sets S k are as de…ned in Footnote 10). We need to show that F satis…es the properties of Part A. Fix arbitrary s; t 2 S with s -t. Then (s) (t) and thus F (s) =x 1 +x 2 + ::: +x (s) F (t) =x 1 +x 2 + ::: +x (s) +x (s)+1 + ::: +x (t) . Conversely, suppose that s; t 2 S are such that F (s) F (t). Thenx 1 +x 2 + ::: +x (s) x 1 +x 2 + ::: +x (t) and thus (s) (t), so that s -t. Thus Property (1) of Part A is satis…ed. Now let s; t; x; y 2 S be such that s t, x y and ( [y]) (which -using -can be expressed as (i; j) : = (k;`)), by our hypothesisx i+1 +x i+2 + ::: +x j = x k+1 +x k+2 + ::: +x`and thus F (t) F (s) = F (y) F (x), so that (2) of Property A is satis…ed. . Let E = fE 1 ; :::; E m g be the system of equations corresponding to the above sequence (for example, E 1 is the equation x i1+1 + x i1+2 + ::: + x j1 = x k1+1 + x k1+2 + ::: + x`1). Let L be the sum of the left-hand-side and R be the sum of the right-hand-side of the equations E 1 ; :::; E m . Note that for every integer i, nx i is a summand of L if and only if i appears in B lef t exactly n times and similarly nx i is a summand of R if and only if i appears in B right exactly n times. By (20) , if nx i is a summand of L then mx i is a summand of R with m n and, furthermore, L 6 = R. Thus there cannot be a positive solution of E, because it would be incompatible with L = R. Since E is a subset of the system of equations corresponding to : =, it follows that the latter cannot have a positive solution either.
It only remains to prove that not (C) ) not (B). We will return to this below after providing an additional result.
First some notation. Given two vectors x; y 2 R m we write (1) x y if x i y i , for every i = 1; :::; m, (2) x < y if x y and x 6 = y and (3) x y if x i < y i , for every i = 1; :::; m.
Lemma 22 Let A be an m n matrix such that the system of equations corresponding to : = (Deinition 13) can be expressed as Ax = 0 (recall that, by symmetry of : =, for each row a i of A there is another row a k such that a k = a i ; an example of such a matrix is given in (13) ; note also that each entry of A is either 1, 0 or 1) . If the system of equations Ax = 0 does not have a positive integer solution then there exist r rows of A, a i1 ; :::; a ir with 1 < r m 2 and r positive integers 1 ; :::; r 2 Nnf0g such that if B is the submatrix of A consisting of the r rows a i1 ; :::; a ir (thus for every k = 1; :::; r, b k = a i k , where b k is the k th row of B) then P r k=1 k b k < 0.
Proof. By Stiemke's theorem 24 if the system of equations Ax = 0 does not have a positive integer solution then there exists a y 2 Z m (where Z denotes the set of integers) such that yA < 0 (that is, P m i=1 y i a i < 0). Let K = fk 2 Z : y k 6 = 0g. Let r be the cardinality of K; then, without loss of generality, we can assume that r m 2 .
25 Furthermore, again without loss of generality, we can assume that for every k 2 K, y k > 0.
26 Let B be the r n submatrix of A consisting of those rows a k of A such that k 2 K and for i = 1; :::; r let = ( 1 ; :::; r ) be the vector corresponding to (y k ) k2K .
27 Then B = P r j=1 j b j = yA < 0 and i 2 Nnf0g for all i = 1; :::; r. Completion of proof of Proposition 14. It remains to prove that not (C) ) not (B). Let A be the m n matrix such that the system of equations corresponding to : = can be expressed as Ax = 0 and assume that Ax = 0 does not have a positive integer solution. Let B be the r n submatrix of A and = ( 1 ; :::; r ) the vector of positive integers of Lemma 22 such that B = P r j=1 j b j < 0. De…ne two r n matrices C = (c ij ) i=1;:::;r; j=1;:::;n and D = (d ij ) i=1;:::;r; j=1;:::;n as follows (recall that each entry of B is either 1, 0 or 1):
Then, for every i = 1; :::; r, b i = c i d i and thus (since 2 5 Proof. Recall that for each row a i of A there is a row a k such that a i = a k . If y i 6 = 0 and y k 6 = 0 for some i and k such that a i = a k then
where all the multipliers (of a i or a k ) are positive. Thus one can set one of the two values of y i and y k to zero and replace the other value with the relevant of the above values while keeping yA unchanged. For example, if y k < y i < 0 then one can replace y i with 0 and y k with (jy i j jy k j) thereby reducing the cardinality of K by one. This process can be repeated until the multipliers of half of the rows of A have been replaced by zero. 2 6 Proof. Suppose that y k < 0 for some k 2 K. Recall that there exists an i such that a k = a i . By the argument of the previous footnote, y i = 0. Then replace y k by 0 and replace y i = 0 byỹ i = y k .
Let C 0 be the matrix obtained from C by replacing each row c i of C with i copies of it and let D 0 be constructed from D similarly. Then, letting s = P r i=1 i , C 0 and D 0 are s n matrices whose entries are either 0 or 1. It follows from (21) that
Consider the system of equations
For every j = 1; :::; n, the j th coordinate of
i is the number of times that the variable x j appears on the left-hand-side of (23) and the j th coordinate of
i is the number of times that the variable x j appears on the right-hand-side of (23). Hence, by (22), for every j = 1; :::; n, the number of times that the variable x j appears on the left-hand-side of (23) is less than or equal to the number of times that it appears on the right-hand-side of (23) and for at least one j it is less. Thus Proof of Lemma 17. Let ( ; ) be rationalized by the plausibility order -and be uniformly Bayesian relative to -. We need to show that ( ; ) is Bayesian relative to -. Fix an arbitrary equivalence class E of -that contains a history h such that (h) > 0. ::a m = h 0 (that is, ha 1 :::a j 2 E for all j = 1; :::; m) and therefore each action a j (j = 1; :::; m) is plausibility preserving; hence, by Property P 1 of De…nition 2, (a j ) > 0 for all j = 1; :::; m. It follows from Property U B2 of De…nition 16 that (ha 1 ) = (h) (a 1 ), (ha 1 a 2 ) = (ha 1 ) (a 2 ) = (h) (a 1 ) (a 2 ), and so on. Hence
Since, by hypothesis, h; h
+ (h 0 ) and thus, using (24) we get that E (h 0 ) = (h) (a1) :::
In order to prove Proposition 18 we will make use of a result proved in [19] . First some notation. If c : A ! (0; 1] and h = a 1 :::a m is a history, we denote the product c(a 1 ) ::: c(a m ) by Q a2h c(a) (a 2 h means that a is an action that appears in history h). If e : A ! Z [ f0g (where Z denotes the set of negative integers) and h = a 1 :::a m is a history, we de…ne e : H ! Z [ f0g by e(h) = P a2h e(a) and if I(h) is the information set containing h, we denote I e (h) = arg maxfe(h 0 ) : h 0 2 I(h)g = fh 0 2 I(h) : e(h 0 ) e(h 00 ); 8h 00 2 I(h)g.
24
The following proposition is proved in [19, 
(B) ( ; ) is KW-consistent.
We can now proceed to the proof of Proposition 18.
Proof of Proposition 18. (A) ) (B). Let ( ; ) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which is rationalized by a choice measurable plausibility order -and is uniformly Bayesian relative to -. We need to show that ( ; ) is a sequential equilibrium. Since ( ; ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, it is sequentially rational and thus we only need to show that ( ; ) is KW-consistent. 
Fix an arbitrary a 2 A and let I a be the information set at which a is available, that is, I a = fh 2 D : a 2 A(h)g (recall the assumption that no action is available at more than one information set: see Remark 21). Assume that (a) > 0; then, by P 1 of the de…nition of AGM-consistency (De…nition 2), a is plausibility preserving, that is, h ha for every h 2 I a . Hence, by Property U B2 of De…nition 16, (ha) = (h) (a). Thus c(a) = 
We prove this by induction. First note that (a 1 a 2 ) = (a 1 )
(a1) = c(a 1 ) c(a 2 ) (recall that, by (25), since a 1 2 A(;), c(a 1 ) = (a 1 )). Now suppose that, for 2 k < m, v(a 1 a 2 :::a k ) = Q k i=1 c(a i ). Then v(a 1 a 2 :::a k a k+1 ) = v(a1a2:::a k a k+1 ) v(a1a2:::a k )
v(a 1 a 2 :::
Given a history h and the information set I(h) that contains it, let M in -I(h) = fh 0 2 I(h) : h 0 -h 00 ; 8h 00 2 I(h)g. Next we show that, for every decision history h 
By Property U B3 of De…nition 16, for every h
E (M in -I(h)) and thus, by (29),
This, together with (27), yields (28). By hypothesis -is choice measurable. Let F be a cardinal integer-valued representation of -(see De…nition 10) and, for every action a, de…ne e(a) = F (h) F (ha) for some h such that a 2 A(h). Then e(a) 0 for all a and e(a) = 0 if and only if a is plausibility preserving. Then, letting e(h) = P a2h e(a), it follows that e(h) = F (h) and thus, given an arbitrary decision history h, M in -I(h) = arg minfF (h 0 ) : h 0 2 I(h)g = arg maxfe(h 0 ) : h 0 2 I(h)g = I e (h). It follows from this and (28) that for every decision history h; (h) = 
Thus, by (26) and (31), it follows from Proposition 23 that ( ; ) is KW-consistent. 
where I e (h) = arg maxfe(h 0 ) : h 0 2 I(h)g = fh 0 2 I(h) : e(h 0 ) e(h 00 ); 8h 00 2 I(h)g and e(h) = P a2h e(a). De…ne the following total pre-order on H:
h -h 0 if and only if e(h) e(h 0 ):
First we show that -rationalizes ( ; ) (De…nition 2). Fix an arbitrary action a and an arbitrary h such that a 2 A(h). If (a) > 0 then, by (32), e(a) = 0 and thus e(ha) = e(h) + e(a) = e(h) and hence h ha; conversely, if h ha then e(ha) = e(h) + e(a) = e(h) and thus e(a) = 0, so that, by (32), (a) > 0. Thus P 1 of De…nition 2 is satis…ed. Now …x an arbitrary decision history h; then, by (34), (h) > 0 if and only if h 2 I e (h) if and only if e(h) e(h 0 ) for all h 0 2 I(h) if and only if h -h 0 for all h 0 2 I(h). Thus also P 2 of De…nition 2 is satis…ed. For every h 2 H de…ne (h) = Q a2h c(a). We need to show that ( ) satis…es the properties of De…nition 16. If h 0 2 I(h) and a 2 A(h) then E (h) P h 0 2Ie(h) E (h 0 ) . Thus Property B3 of De…nition 4 holds if P h 0 2Ie(h) E (h 0 ) = P h 0 2I(h) E (h 0 ) but this is an immediate consequence of (37), since if h 0 2 I(h)nI e (h) then, by (37), (h 0 ) = 0 and thus, by (36), E (h 0 ) = 0:
